:: Volume 9, Issue 1 (Winter 2020) ::
Shefaye Khatam 2020, 9(1): 68-78 Back to browse issues page
Intentional Binding and Sense of Agency of Visual Outcomes
Fatemeh Ansarinejad, Alireza Moradi *, Reza Khosroabadi, Ali Fathi Ashtiani
Department of Clinical Psychology, Faculty of Psychology and Educational Sciences, Kharazmi University, Tehran, Iran , moradi@khu.ac.ir
Abstract:   (1697 Views)
Introduction: The interval between voluntary actions and their outcomes are perceived as shorter than the interval between similar involuntary actions and the outcomes. This bias in time perception may be related to the sense of agency which has been referred to as intentional binding (IB). In this study, we investigated the effect of IB on voluntary action and its visual outcome (ie. color changing to red, green, blue, and yellow). Besides, we compared the IB effects among these different colors. Materials and Methods: 19 right-handed subjects (14 women and 5 men) have participated in baseline and experimental studies. Participants should press a key and after that, they would face color-change, then they reported the time perceptions, via referring to Libet's clock. These data were compared to the baseline data (pressing key without color-change and color-change without pressing the key). We modified Libet's clock in a new version to study the IB of visual effect. Results: The results show that the total IB (sum of action IB and color IB) in overall and distinct colors was significantly different. Action IB was not significantly different, however, the happening of the color IB in overall and distinct colors was significantly different. Furthermore, a significant difference between action IB - blue outcomes was observed compared to action IB – green and yellow outcomes. There were no significant differences among different color IB. Conclusion: Using innovative Libet's clock, we could investigate and compare IB of visual outcome in 4 different colors. Our results have been in line with previous studies and with the retrospective viewpoint of IB phenomena.
Keywords: Intention, Time Perception, Color
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Type of Study: Research --- Open Access, CC-BY-NC | Subject: Cognitive Neuroscience
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